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1. Since we are all natural language communicants, we always construct implicit messages when
we speak or write to each other. Enthymemes have to do with implicitness but of course, they
differ in scope. Some of the differences easily come to mind. Thus, enthymemes only occur in
reasoning (argumentation) and are themselves incomplete arguments while implicitness is a
general property of natural language. Strictly speaking, we never can encounter non-implicit
sentences because in both their focal and non-focal parts there is always something having to do
with shared and individual information.
Therefore, the components of natural language arguments, being expressed by sentences are
inherently partially implicit: (a) linguistically, since elliptic argumentative sentences are often
used, particularly, in dialogues; (b) cognitively, since it is not possible to explicate everything
he/she grounds his/her message on for fear of never leaving a vicious circle of the need to
clarify; (c) pragmatically, because in sincere argumentation a sender would probably want
his/her message to be purpose-sufficient (thus leaving a lot of pertaining information aside),
precise (leaving elaboration aside) and laconic (leaving details aside) (cf. H.P.Grice’s (1975)
principles of efficient communication). These factors must be taken into account for analyzing
the comprehension activities of recipients: to what extent (if ever) do they need to reconstruct the
unexpressed information?
2. At first sight, linguistic reconstruction proper is easy to perform, because it does not appear to
need special scholarly skills; cognitive and pragmatic reconstruction is harder to do because
these types of activities usually interrelate. But that is not necessarily so. On the one hand, what
is possible to be done does not always need to be done, and, some parts of the message may
remain unreconstructed. On the other hand, there are types and procedures of comprehension that
concern not only linguistic comprehension proper, but also the cognitive and pragmatic ones.
Thus, a recipient never analyzes all components of the message with one and the same
degree of precision. This is because we, as recipients, apply different kinds of understanding to
different parts of the message that we comprehend. In understanding, I differentiate between
referent recognition, meaning comprehension, sense decoding, and sense comparison. The
ground for this taxonomy is semiotic structure of messages.
According to systemic-semiotic approach (R.Piotrovsky’s St.Petersburg school – cf.:
Lesokhin et al, 1982), studying how the text functions presupposes detecting meaning and sense
of the text and is implemented on two levels of semiosis. Text is treated in that approach as a
compound sign thus being the result of primary semiosis; it functions as a ready-made model in
various situations of communication (secondary semiosis). In the primary semiosis the potential
information of the text is reflected. In the semiotic structure of the text, the content is placed into
the Designation which is a set of characteristics of the referential situation. The mental picture of
the referent is a Denotation seen as a single whole. The morphologo-syntactic image of the
material text is regarded as an Index. Emotional and evaluative features of the referent are
regarded as a Connotation. In the secondary semiosis (a concrete situation) the text acquires a
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Concept as a set of communicatively important Designation features on which comprehension of
the referential situation is based. The number of text Concepts is thus equal to the number of text
recipients. This view of semiosis applies to highly rigid (easily modelled) texts where the Index
is readily identified and reconstructed.
We propose a somewhat different model for text comprehension. In our view, secondary
semiosis has little to do with non-literal sign comprehension; rather, it is understanding
differentiated for different communicants depending on individual spheres of their
Significations. The figure below is a schematic description of semiosis.
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Figure 1. Message semiosis (IF stands for individual field, CF – for conventional field)

Sign comprehension order is practically the reverse of that of sign production. The ideal
sphere of semiosis comprises the Content part, the Translation part and the Exponent part. In the
material sphere we find the body of an exponent, a sender, a receiver, and a situation / an object;
the material part is not of primary importance for semiosis. The Content part contains the
Denotation, the Perception, and the Signification; the latter consists of designative area and the
referential area. All the referential area and a part of the designative make up the conventional
field of the Signification; the rest of the designative sphere is the individual field of the
Signification. The Translation part contains (linguistic) meaning. The Exponent part contains the
image of a sign body. This representation is oriented at the semantic aspect of comprehension
where explicit signs are present.
The Denotation is treated of here as an ideal object, its ideal representation which is still
non-symbolised. The Denotation correlates to the Perception but does not inherit all its features;
this is correlation of the virtual VS. actual type. If actual reflection of the situation takes place,
the notions of Denotation and Perception are mandatory for semiosis. If an object is extracted
from memory, the denoting process is carried out without the Perception.
The Signification has a complex structure. On the one hand, there are referential and
designative areas, on the other – individual and conventional fields. The term conventional
seems preferable to others (p.ex. mutual, common, etc.) because it can be easily applied for
various texts, including scientific and argumentative ones. The text is aimed to transmit
information about a state of affairs. When encoded, the latter first of all generates the denotativereferential structure of the text. This encoding is carried out by means of non-reflexive
imprinting and is not linguistic in the strict sense of the word. Referent formation is class
identification of a Denotation. The mentioned denotative-referential complex is then correlated
with a model already present in the person’s memory. This type of reflection is no more passive
but is purposeful. This is a designation stage of message generation.
Based on the treatment of semiosis we can single out different types of message
comprehension. The general type will be Understanding. Within it, we single out three types.
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Referent recognition applies to all fully-significant message elements to form a general
meaningful idea of the message. Referentially-deficient recognition is understanding of
syntactically functional elements because they do not denote objects or ideas but only unite them
into a single whole (a sentence). For example, in This behaviour of yours is an absolute disgrace
all the words are referentially recognised except of where referentially-deficient recognition
takes place. Referent recognition is basic type of understanding, i.e. no higher type is possible
without such recognition.
There are communicatively focal / important elements that need concentration by recipients.
Only to such elements do we apply the rest of the types of understanding. Designation
comprehension implies understanding notional characteristics of the focal elements. If the former
are shared (collectively or with the recipient only), we deal with meaning; if they are individual
(i.e. different from the recipient’s), we deal with sense. The notional characteristics of the foci
can be expressed in their premises (p.ex., when the focal element is a phrase or a sentence). If the
premises are explicit, the recipient can compare them with the ones she herself would have for
the focal element in question. If they are implicit, they need to be reconstructed for adequate
estimation of the focus. Such reconstruction is argumentative by nature because the recipient
looks for grounds of the analysed notions.
Sense decoding is based on prognostic reconstruction of the premises; they presumably
reflect the sender’s individual background. Efficient here can be local coherence analysis based
on an informal syllogistic technique. The technique is based on transforming the focal message
into a rigid subject-predicate structure to which an algorithm is applied for getting
unambiguously formulated premises. That is a method of syllogistic argument reconstruction
where the recipient finds valid premises.
Sense comparison is applied to the reconstructed premises: the recipient evaluates their
degree of plausibility to his/her own. If they are “good”, the argument is correct. The notion of
correctness is applicable only to arguments, and not to the focal messages proper: the latter can
be consistent with the recipient’s background (and therefore be correct) but may not follow from
the sender’s message if the reconstructed premises are inconsistent with the previous or
succeeding explicit information in her text.
3. Partially implicit communication becomes enthymematic in argumentative contexts.
We do not always reconstruct enthymemes to comprehend an argument correctly if we feel
or think that the missing premise is self-evident. The problem here is, however, that the selfevidence has to be conventional; if it is not, we (argumentation scholars) try to find the way out
using certain principles like Charity. But the Charity Principle is culturally-specific (cf. a stark
example of categorization principles in the Maori language in Australia, which are very different
from ours – cf. G.Lakoff). That means that conventions are also conventional. Another problem
with the Principle is that in everyday argumentation conventions can be linked with different
message elements, i.e. presuppositions can be used for elements of the sentence, and not for the
sentence as a whole. Two cases can be mentioned in this respect: (A) arguments with one-place
predicate and (B) with two- or three-place predicates, cf.:
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(A)
_

Oh yes, family life is wonderful! (charitable sentence presupposition: love and tenderness,
kids, homely atmosphere)

_

Really? Do you call it life? (subject kernel presupposition: impossibility to always make your
own choice, limitations in behavior, etc. – all having to do with what looks like existence
rather than with life)

In this dialogue, there is a syntactico-semantic shift. This shift has a double nature. In the
surface structure of the sentence, there is a focus shift from the kernel of the predicate to the
kernel of the subject. Non-emphatic utterances in the English language are standardly
constructed so that principal information could be placed in its final part. The recipient, however,
intentionally places the accent on the previously unfocused part of the sentence thus changing its
pragmatic meaning.
In the inner semantic structure, the shift is of a feedback type: what is meant is, first, that
family life is not wonderful and, secondly, why exactly it is not, with the presuppositions
functioning as premises. The focusing of the subject is thus inalienable from the property
information contained in the predicate: if there were no estimation, there would probably be no
questioning of definitions.
(B)
_ Our soldiers have killed that monstrous beast at last! (charitable sentence presupposition:
The monstrous beast deserves being killed)
_ (a) Are they soldiers? They used their guns! (subject kernel presupposition: The brave would
never use their weapons against the unarmed)
(b) Killed? They were executing him for half an hour! (predicate kernel presupposition: If
one is tortured when executed, it is murder)
(c) Monstrous, you said? Do you find buffaloes monstrous, too? (complement phrase
presupposition: the ugly-looking animals can be nice “for beauty is found within”).
These examples show that unlike in the case (A), reconstruction of presuppositions in multiplace predicate sentences does not have to depend on other parts of the sentence. Therefore, the
Principle of Charity can be differently applicable for reconstruction of arguments with different
structures. Therefore, different reasoning systems should be used for reconstructing enthymemes
of different syntactico-semantic types.
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